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Abstract
This paper critiques the version of the argument that the regulation of hateful speech 
by the state undermines its democratic legitimacy made by Ronald Dworkin and 
James Weinstein (hereafter the Legitimacy Argument). It argues that in some cases 
the harmful effects of hateful speech on the democratic process outweigh those of 
restriction. It does not challenge the central premise of the Legitimacy Argument, 
that a wide-ranging right to freedom of expression is an essential political right 
in a liberal democracy. Instead, it uses ideal and nonideal theory as a framework 
for judgements about the regulation of hate speech. The mistake underpinning the 
Legitimacy Argument is that it assumes that other conditions pervade that make an 
ideal democratic procedure possible when they do not. In reality the state can be put 
in a position where, whatever course of action it takes with regard to the regulation 
or non-regulation of hate speech, some citizens will not be able to participate fully 
in political deliberation. Under such conditions there remain strong pro tanto rea-
sons not to regulate hate speech on democratic grounds, but they are not all-things-
considered reasons, and there are also pro tanto reasons to regulate hate speech that 
might outweigh them in some cases. This leads to the cautious conclusion that while 
there might be a normative justification for the regulation of hate speech in indi-
vidual instances, the debate is best understood as one between competing pro tanto 
reasons, and must be approached on a case-by-case basis.
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Introduction
One argument against restrictions on hateful speech is that they undermine the 
democratic legitimacy of the state. Restrictions on speech acts, so this argument 
goes, to undermine the capacity of citizens to articulate their views in the politi-
cal arena and therefore prevents them from participating fully in the process of 
co-authoring laws. Because co-authorship of laws is a necessary condition of the 
legitimacy of those laws, when this is impeded by restrictions on speech acts, so 
is the legitimacy of any laws produced. In this paper I critically assess a version 
of this argument outlined in brief by Dworkin (2009), and more expansively by 
Weinstein (2017a), which I refer to as the Legitimacy Argument.
An opposing position argues that hate speech itself harms the democratic pro-
cess, so might justifiably be limited in defence of democracy. According to this 
position, hate speech serves to undermine the political status of some citizens. 
Where equal political status is a necessary condition of legitimate policy-making, 
hate speech can therefore undermine the legitimacy of this process. This is moti-
vated by a belief that the Legitimacy Argument understates both that democratic 
legitimacy presupposes a level of relational equality between citizens in the polit-
ical sphere and that hateful acts of expression can, in some circumstances, erode 
such relationships. This article sides broadly with the second position, and argues 
that there are reasons to restrict hateful speech on democratic grounds in some 
instances.
Both proponents and critics of the Legitimacy Argument draw on the idea of 
effective political voice, or the capacity to shape and influence laws. In this arti-
cle I argue that both sides are somewhat correct in the way they invoke this, and 
that both (a subset of) hate speech, and regulations of such speech can have a 
harmful effect on legitimacy. In cases where hateful speech undermines its tar-
gets’ political voice, there are therefore strong pro tanto reasons both to restrict 
and not to restrict it. Tension between these pro tanto reasons cannot be resolved 
with reference to a simple principle, or formulation of the kind ‘only speech acts 
with content of type X in context Y must be restricted by the state’. Instead, they 
must be weighted against each other on a case-by-case basis. This cuts against the 
Legitimacy Argument, which argues that the harms of restriction on democratic 
legitimacy are typically, and in most existing liberal democracies, greater than the 
harms to democratic legitimacy caused by hateful speech.
To make this argument, I frame the debate in terms of ideal and nonideal 
theory. I argue that under ideal conditions this tension between strong pro tanto 
reasons would not arise. Real, nonideal cases are therefore best understood as 
moral blind alleys, where all courses of action or inaction are harmful, in terms of 
their effect on democratic legitimacy, as they entail deviation from a democratic 
ideal. The debate ought therefore to be framed around the possibility of realising 
the best possible approximation to legitimate policy-making. The failure of the 
Legitimacy Argument is that it implicitly assumes certain ideal conditions that 
are absent in the real world. It is possible to envisage a situation where hateful 
speech could never undermine democratic legitimacy, and if this were the case 
1 3
Does Regulating Hate Speech Undermine Democratic Legitimacy?…
the Legitimacy Argument would hold. However, such a situation would require a 
greater degree of political equality than currently exists.
Framing the debate using the language of ideal and nonideal theory has two 
advantages. First, those who have defended hate speech regulations by invoking 
political voice have been accused of minimising the effects of hate speech regula-
tions on democratic participation. I believe there is something to this critique, even 
though I ultimately believe there are cases where restriction is justified. By position-
ing the choice that states make as a ‘tragic’ one between two flawed options I am 
better able to acknowledge the harmful effects of regulation on democratic participa-
tion than other critics of the Legitimacy Argument. It also allows me to make the 
argument in favour of restriction on hate speech without denying that an expansive 
right to freedom of expression is constitutive of democratic legitimacy. As such, it 
enables me to take on the Legitimacy Argument on its own terms. Second, it helps 
separate the ‘moving parts’ of the various positions in the debate around the Legiti-
macy Argument: the requirements of democratic legitimacy; the role of freedom of 
expression in this process; and the specific impact of hateful speech on it. It shows 
that both sides have a similar view of democratic legitimacy in mind, and highlights 
that the disagreement between the two positions is more pronounced on the question 
of how to apply a democratic ideal in practice, and on the empirical effects of hate 
speech.
A Note on Definitions and the Scope of the Argument
This article asks the question of how restrictions on hateful speech impacts on legit-
imacy. Therefore, it does not consider other, unrelated arguments in favour of an 
unrestricted right to freedom of expression.
I focus on legitimacy in a normative sense. The question I aim to answer is 
whether states are morally justified in imposing laws, and whether citizens are mor-
ally obliged to obey them. I also assume that legitimacy is a matter of degree—
that is, that a state might plausibly be described as more or less legitimate, or par-
tially legitimate. There is a separate question around ‘descriptive legitimacy’, which 
focuses on whether the state enjoys the support of citizens and appears legitimate 
to them.1 Weinstein, for example, seeks to buttress the Legitimacy Argument by 
pointing out that it is, among ‘normatively appealing’ reasons to defend a right to 
freedom of expression, more consistent with existing doctrine in (American) law, 
and subject to a more widespread consensus than the other contenders (Weinstein 
2011b, pp. 668–669). I do not consider these arguments here. Instead, I focus on the 
question of legitimacy as a normative property in the abstract.
Two other sets of terms that I use through the article are ‘hate speech’; and a 
‘wide-ranging’ or ‘expansive’ right to freedom of expression. I use the second two 
terms interchangeably to refer to a right to freedom of expression that includes 
1 See Post (2017) for a contribution to this debate focused on descriptive legitimacy. Weinstein (2011a) 
splits a wide-ranging discussion of the relationship between hate speech and legitimacy the same way.
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protection for hateful speech, and is not limited by hate speech laws of the kind that 
exist in any real, liberal democracies. I do not offer a specific definition of ‘hate-
ful speech’ either, though I use the term throughout. This is because I suggest that 
there are some speech acts that might justifiably be regulated on democratic grounds 
because of the effects that they have. Speech acts that might have this effect are 
really a subset of what is usually defined as hateful speech within certain contexts. 
Therefore, the speech acts that I believe might be regulated on democratic grounds 
will, I believe as a matter of fact, be hateful, in that they will be vituperative or 
threatening, and target a particular group. However, it should not be regulated 
because of one of these characteristics so I do not believe that all hateful speech may 
be regulated; only a subset of it that might have certain effects. The reason that I use 
the language of hate speech is because the Legitimacy Argument is often used to 
challenge existing hate speech legislation, I believe incorrectly.
The Legitimacy Argument
The Legitimacy Argument is that any restriction on freedom of expression under-
mines the legitimacy of the state, because to prevent someone from speaking, even 
hatefully, is to prevent them from participating in the democratic process as they 
are entitled to. Dworkin presents the starkest version of this view, stating that ‘[i]
t is unfair to impose a collective decision on someone who has not been allowed 
to contribute to the moral environment’ (Dworkin 2009, p. viii). He characterises 
freedom of expression as part of a political deliberation that occurs ‘upstream’ of 
the imposition of laws. The argument he makes is that in order for the laws ‘down-
stream’ at the level of imposition to be legitimate, restrictions cannot be in place 
‘upstream’ at the level of political deliberation. So, for example, we cannot impose 
anti-discrimination laws on bigots ‘downstream’ if they have not been permitted 
to articulate their bigoted views ‘upstream’ (Dworkin 2009, p. vii). This argument 
appeals to a broadly liberal worldview whereby the legitimacy of laws is achieved 
through a process of public justification. When the state places limits on political 
discourse, it prevents citizens from articulating potential objections, or seeking to 
challenge proposed laws and provide alternatives. Because of this, any restriction 
of freedom of speech ‘implies at least a partial suspension of democracy’ (Rawls 
2005, p. 354). From this perspective, the legitimacy of laws depends on them being 
justified to all citizens through a procedure that allows them to raise objections and 
potential counter-arguments.
Dworkin’s argument is brief, and appears overwrought; it seems implausible 
to argue that the legitimacy of laws like anti-discrimination laws is completely 
destroyed if there are limited restrictions placed on hateful speech at some point in 
the political process (Waldron 2012a, p. 186, b). Weinstein offers a refined version 
of the Legitimacy Argument in which he concedes that if it were possible to restrict 
solely the vituperative content of hateful speech acts, such restrictions would not 
‘destroy’ or even ‘significantly impair’ normative legitimacy (2017a, pp. 548, 549, 
n. 90). His worry is that restrictions on hateful speech will also prevent people from 
articulating the propositional content of their argument, which in his mind would 
1 3
Does Regulating Hate Speech Undermine Democratic Legitimacy?…
undermine the legitimacy of laws produced (Weinstein 2017a, pp. 564–565). This is 
because in Weinstein’s view hate speech laws have frequently been applied to pun-
ish speakers for non-vituperative expression of bigoted ideas (Weinstein 2017a, pp. 
561–562).2 Citizens ought to have avenues open to them to advance legitimate inter-
ests and raise legitimate concerns to others about laws, and it is this that hate speech 
laws, or indeed any laws restricting a wide-ranging right to freedom of expression, 
might inhibit. The opportunity to participate effectively in politics like this is a con-
dition of legitimacy, so when it is restricted the legitimacy of the laws produced is 
diminished too (Weinstein 2017a, p. 537).
Challenging the Legitimacy Argument
There are two strategies that can be pursued to counter the Legitimacy Argument in 
favour of hate speech regulation. We might accept that hate speech restrictions harm 
legitimacy, but defend the legitimacy of particular laws based on moral reasons inde-
pendent of the process by which the laws were produced. We could also ‘bite the 
bullet’ and try to argue that a right to freedom of expression in general is not actu-
ally required by the accounts of legitimacy that underpin the Legitimacy Argument.3 
The alternative, which I pursue in this article, is to argue that hate speech might 
undermine the legitimacy of laws for similar reasons that restrictions on speech do, 
that is by inhibiting political participation. This is a result of the harmful effects of 
hate speech that ‘dignitarian’ accounts of hate speech like Waldron’s (2012a) point 
to, such as the undermining of civic dignity and standing. Pace the first possible 
response, the indignity suffered by targets of hate speech is not something that needs 
to be weighted against legitimacy, but is ‘constitutive’ of it (Brown 2015, p. 208). 
This can be understood as an internal critique of the Legitimacy Argument, given 
that it accepts both the broad account of legitimacy that Dworkin and Weinstein do, 
and also that restrictions on hate speech can impinge upon legitimacy.
According to this critique, an ‘aggressive’ free speech regime that protects hate 
speech would deprive the targets of an adequate political voice (Brown 2017, p. 
616). For citizens who are marginalised in this way, political institutions fail the 
standards of public justification that underpin the Legitimacy Argument because 
there is no reason that they ought to accept this state of affairs (Brown 2017, pp. 
616–617). If this is the case then, to use the language employed by Dworkin and 
Weinstein, hate speech may, in some contexts undermine the ‘upstream’ mecha-
nisms by which legitimate laws are produced, meaning that targets of hate speech, 
and the citizenry more broadly, do not have as much reason to treat downstream laws 
as legitimate (Waldron 2012a, pp. 70–71).
2 Weinstein discusses the empirical case for this silencing effect in greater detail in the same article 
(2017a, pp. 552–561).
3 See Bonotti (2015, pp. 196–201) for an argument that a Rawlsian account of legitimacy does not 
require an expansive right to freedom of expression, but instead only that certain norms around public 
justification and deliberative stability are enforced.
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When Dworkin sets out the Legitimacy Argument, he conflates a thicker, more 
substantive account of political equality—equal political ‘voice’ or influence that 
depends on equal status—with a thinner protection of core rights or negative liber-
ties. He argues that we have a right both to ‘raise a protest’ and ‘shape the moral 
environment’ (Dworkin 2009, pp. vii, viii). These two are quite different, as the lat-
ter implies that we are entitled to an adequate opportunity to participate in the shap-
ing of laws, whilst the former implies merely the chance to express certain views 
and ‘sound off’ unimpeded. Similarly, Weinstein invokes a standard of normative 
legitimacy that treats ‘equal opportunity to participate in the political process’ as a 
necessary condition of normative legitimacy (Weinstein 2017a, pp. 536–539). He 
defines the equal opportunity to participate in a thin, formal sense—to ‘raise a pro-
test’ using Dworkin’s terminology (Weinstein 2011a, p. 506). However, he acknowl-
edges that some only see formal rights as necessary to legitimacy because they are 
constitutive of political voice conceived in the thicker, substantive sense—the right 
to ‘shape the moral environment’ in Dworkin’s terms (Weinstein 2017a, p. 537). I 
believe that the most normatively attractive version of the Legitimacy Argument 
incorporates this thicker, substantive view of equality in the political sphere and the 
process of co-authoring laws. I take this view because, for me, the attraction of the 
Legitimacy Argument lies in the centrality of equal respect as a value, and its broad 
commitment to public justification, which I believe requires equality of this kind 
between citizens.
There is inevitably a wide range of views as to what substantive political equal-
ity entails. To narrow this down a bit, we can draw upon Dworkin’s own view that 
whilst an effective capacity to shape the moral environment does not entail equal-
ity of influence, it does require equality of ‘political standing’ (Dworkin 2011, pp. 
388–392).4 This requires a distribution of political power that is compatible with 
‘the political community’s equal concern and respect for all of its members’ (Dwor-
kin 2011, p. 391).
It is this point that Brown is targeting in his critique of the Legitimacy Argu-
ment outlined above: he argues that hate speech can inculcate a lack of respect that 
is severe enough that citizens ought not, reasonably, be expected to accept it going 
unchallenged.
It is one thing to point out that the Legitimacy Argument is dependent on a sub-
stantive account of political voice, but for challenges like Brown’s to succeed they 
need to show how hate speech undermines this. Proponents of the Legitimacy Argu-
ment tend towards a view of democracy as a process of public justification and 
deliberation amongst equals; they outline a view of democracy that is in parts delib-
erative and participatory (Brown 2015, p. 190). This conception of democratic legit-
imacy depends on citizens having not just formal rights, but an effective political 
voice, which involves, at the very least, the capacity to influence others (Jarymowicz 
4 This is a general issue with defences of freedom of expression linked to legitimacy. See, for example, 
Post (2011, pp. 482–484). Post does not set out the legitimacy argument explicitly, but he does defend 
freedom of expression with reference to a participatory system of democracy. Furthermore, in doing so 
he argues it is constitutive of political autonomy, that he emphasises requires equal standing.
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2014, pp. 115–116). This political voice depends on citizens treating each other as 
equals, so means that it is impossible to divorce the idea of civic dignity from effec-
tive, or substantive, membership of the deliberative community (Brown 2017, p. 
609). Having an adequate voice means more than just being able to say the same 
things as others; it means that the other participants in that deliberation treat you 
with a degree of respect, and are prepared to at least countenance being influenced 
by your view (Heyman 2009, p. 172). This entails a mutual respect for the ‘delibera-
tive capacities’ of other citizens (Cohen 1997a, pp. 92–93). Deploying the Legiti-
macy Argument to defend freedom of expression as a negative liberty without any 
reference to the process by which speech acts are rendered more or less effective 
politically underestimates the extent to which this substantive political equality is 
inevitably ‘relational’—it depends on how citizens treat each other, and in turn how 
the state regulates this (Jarymowicz 2014, p. 114; Brown 2015, p. 203).
There are two significant ways that hate speech might undermine these relation-
ships. On an individual level, the targets of hate speech might be less inclined to 
participate in politics because of a sense that they are not treated with dignity, or in 
extreme cases because they feel threatened (Brown 2017, pp. 609–610). In this arti-
cle, I focus, instead, on the claim that hate speech might have a deeper pathological 
effect on political discourse, because it might plausibly cause people to be taken less 
seriously in politics when they do decide to participate. The account of legitimisa-
tion that I have drawn upon in this article has been one that depends on participants 
in politics adhering to certain basic deliberative norms, specifically treating others 
with respect as deliberators. This mutual respect might be undermined if certain 
groups are routinely treated as if they lack core deliberative capacities, which is a 
potential effect of hate speech.
The obligation to take others seriously and respect them in deliberation is difficult 
to pin down. In practice, most people do not comply with this in the way that par-
ticipatory or deliberative democrats suggest they should at all times. Even the most 
liberal-minded citizens inevitably seek to influence others in order to secure certain 
policy outcomes without ever really being prepared to consider their counterpoints 
on their own merit and be persuaded. It therefore makes sense to think of this in 
terms of ideal theory, where we define this in the traditional Rawlsian sense of full 
compliance with the requirements of justice and favourable background conditions 
(Simmons 2010), and where there is widespread noncompliance that means that the 
ideal cannot be met. It is also a requirement that is essentially unenforceable—it 
would be both impossible and illiberal to ‘force’ citizens to respect others, or seek to 
change deeply bigoted beliefs coercively. Despite this, there are some areas in which 
they can be promoted by the state. For example, it is possible to enforce norms of 
civility in some political contexts that might indirectly contribute to a more respect-
ful environment. It is these second-order norms that foster respect that hate speech 
might come to undermine (Jarymowicz 2014, pp. 117–121).
What sets some hate speech apart as a particularly acute violation of this norm 
that might warrant coercive restriction by the state is the way that it can affect these 
second-order norms, and in turn shape social attitudes towards others or cause the 
target to adjust their behaviour. The particular harmful effect of hate speech is there-
fore to cause others—not the speaker or the target—to ‘transgress the basic ground 
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rules of deliberation’ in their treatment of the target (Heyman 2009, p. 176). This 
creates a second-order silencing effect where certain voices are systematically disre-
garded in a way that violates a view of legitimacy that depends on effective political 
participation. Hate speech has a ‘disfiguring’ effect on the wider ‘social environ-
ment’, and this can rub off on political deliberation (Waldron 2012a, p. 117). If hate 
speech has this effect it means that it is possible that it harms legitimacy even where 
it does not have a ‘silencing effect’ on individuals, by causing them to not partici-
pate in aspects of politics.5 Instead, it suggests that hate speech might mean that citi-
zens are able to participate less effectively as a result of changes in others’ behaviour 
and political norms.
Where such norms are inculcated, a liberal standard of democratic legitimacy 
cannot be met, as some citizens who are entitled to participate in the process of 
authoring and justifying laws lack the de facto capacity to do so, even if there are 
not formal legal obstacles to this being the case. It is actions that have this effect that 
might justifiably be subject to restriction from a liberal perspective.
Because my worry is about the second-order effects of hate speech, this argument 
does not entail purely viewpoint-selective restrictions on hate speech, and the kind 
of hate speech that might be restricted is therefore not defined entirely according to 
its content.6 Instead, such restrictions would apply to a subset of hateful speech acts, 
that might cause the silencing effect or restrict others’ political voice.7 Though I am 
unable to provide a full account of these within the scope of this article, factors will 
include the context and medium of the remarks made, the authority of the speaker, 
and in particular the nature of any existing injustices and discrimination suffered by 
the group being targeted.
The ‘Nuanced Principle’ as Necessary Condition
Given the above there are occasions where hate speech restrictions may be justi-
fied in order to preserve democratic legitimacy. This is something like Brown’s 
‘Nuanced Principle of Democracy’ that ‘legalistic constraints on uses of hate speech 
are (N-)warranted if they operate for the sake of ensuring that all citizens enjoy real 
opportunities to participate in public discourse’ (Brown 2015, p. 195). The nature 
of this claim hinges on what ‘(N-)warranted’ means in this context; for Brown it 
6 Waldron (2012a) argues for content-based restrictions on hate speech, but later qualifies this by stating 
that such restrictions are justified because of the likely effects of their content (Waldron 2017, p. 701). In 
making this adjustment, I take him to be arguing that it is the effect of hate speech that means it might 
justifiably be limited, and that there might be an empirical case that all speech that contains certain con-
tent will have this effect. The second point is a distinct empirical claim, which I leave aside here.
7 This is a fairly common position when considering restrictions on political rights from a liberal 
perspective. An orthodox position in the liberal literature argues that those who behave unreasonably 
nonetheless retain their political rights, unless there is a specific reason to try to restrict their behaviour 
because of a wider harmful effect on the polity (Quong 2011, Ch. 10). My argument is consistent with 
this approach.
5 Weinstein’s argument against Brown on this issue is in part an empirical challenge to the idea of this 
silencing effect (2017a, pp. 578–581).
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is a ‘narrow warrant’ that a principle holds until it is ‘overridden or trumped’ by a 
countervailing argument that also draws upon a normatively salient feature of the 
case under discussion (3). This means that the state might restrict hate speech on 
democratic grounds so long as there are not countervailing reasons to protect a more 
expansive right to freedom of expression on behalf of the speaker of hate speech.
I agree with Brown that if hate speech does undermine democratic voice then this 
does generate a pro tanto reason to restrict it; indeed, I would strengthen this point 
and state that hate speech undermining effective political participation is a necessary 
condition for any case for restriction on democratic grounds. However, there remain 
strong pro tanto reasons not to interfere in such instances (that I believe Brown 
underplays), because any restrictions on expression will, by their nature, harm the 
political process by limiting effective participation, and because of a latent risk 
of overreach by the state in seeking to enforce these norms (Weinstein 2017b, pp. 
770–771).8 The presence of the reasons to restrict hateful speech that I have outlined 
in the previous section do not eliminate the silencing effects of regulations on such 
speech, that Weinstein pointed to in his defence of the Legitimacy Argument. There 
are therefore situations where we have good reason to reject both restrictions on hate 
speech and the absence of restrictions: speakers have legitimate reasons to be wary 
that their legitimate interests will be disregarded, whilst targets will not be able to 
fully realise their political voice as a result of marginalisation. The legitimacy of 
state interference to limit hate speech must therefore be judged on a case-by-case 
basis that weights these two sets of pro tanto reasons against each other. This con-
trasts with a view that if a speech act serves to undermine the speech of others then 
it is required that it be restricted, and the view that even if hate speech harms legiti-
macy, any restrictions undermine it to a greater extent.9
In the final section I orientate this trade-off view by drawing on some of the lit-
erature around ideal and nonideal theory. First, it is necessary to lay out some rea-
sons that we ought not to adopt a view that in a set of cases we might assume that 
we ought always to rule in favour of restriction. In doing so, I want to guard against 
understating the ways in which restrictions of speech might have a ‘silencing effect’ 
on the speaker, and the extent to which the options of hate speakers in real-world 
conditions to advance their views in a more reasonable fashion are sometimes lim-
ited. Part of the issue here is that proponents of the Legitimacy Argument are prone 
to exaggerate the silencing effects of some hate speech laws, eliding any restrictions 
8 I am less concerned with potential overreach than Weinstein, who worries more generally about 
enforcing deliberative norms. In addition Weinstein argues that the state must exhaust other avenues of 
shaping deliberative norms prior to restriction, including, but not limited to, positive counter-speech to 
hate speech (2017a, pp. 581, 583, n. 190). I do not disagree with this, but assume in at least some cases 
that these measures will be insufficient.
9 I do not believe anyone takes the first view. Weinstein appears to adopt the second, however, when he 
argues that whilst hate speech might harm legitimacy, for it to be justifiably restricted ‘[i]t must be fur-
ther demonstrated that the gain in legitimacy produced by the hate speech ban at least marginally exceeds 
the detriment to legitimacy caused by the speech restriction’ (Weinstein 2017a, p. 581), something that 
he does not believe there is persuasive empirical evidence for at the moment (Weinstein 2017a, p. 579, n. 
183).
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on speech with complete exclusion from the public sphere (Waldron 2017, p. 700).10 
However, there is a danger of going too far the other way.
In particular, there are effects to restrictions on expression that extend beyond 
limits to particular attempts to articulate a political position. Those who are silenced, 
even when there is good reason, suffer a degree of social and political stigma. Hate 
speech restrictions inevitably end up doing more than merely preventing someone 
from using hateful or vituperative speech to make a political point in a given con-
text. This is particularly true if you consider hate speech as I have presented, in the 
context of an existing political system that does not live up to a democratic ideal. In 
such a context, disruptive acts such as hateful speech might draw attention to con-
stituencies or groups that do not, currently, have an effective political voice. The var-
ious cases of hateful speech by populist (and predominantly right-wing) politicians 
may be justifiably restricted, but we should not ignore the fact that part of the reason 
that such groups gain traction in the first place is because part of their constituency 
feel, rightly, that they have been marginalised in the political process. Of course the 
targets of hate speech themselves often lack political power, so this argument does 
not mean that we should argue against restriction in all cases. Nonetheless, it sup-
ports the view that the competing reasons on either side of the debate really are 
closely matched.
More generally, just as the Legitimacy Argument presupposes an idealised view 
of actual political participation, many of its critics are guilty of having too ideal-
ised a view about the other ways that citizens are able to articulate their views when 
speech is restricted. In this, I side with Weinstein in worrying that bans on hateful 
speech cannot be targeted at vituperative speech exclusively. Brown, for example, 
argues that we ought not see the question as a set of trade-offs where the benefits 
of hate speech bans to legitimacy are framed as ‘potentially offsetting’ the harm-
ful effects of restrictions of speech (Brown 2017, p. 616). For Brown, what mat-
ters is that we ensure all have ‘sufficient real opportunity to contribute to political 
discourse and participate in the formation of public opinion’ (Brown 2017, p. 616). 
His rejection of the kind of trade-off view I have outlined is, like the Legitimacy 
Argument, underpinned by a belief that all citizens can have sufficient opportunity 
to participate politically.11 I do not believe that this is always the case; sometimes 
both an act of hate speech and the act of restricting it will undermine political par-
ticipation in a way that seriously impinges on democratic legitimacy. Under such 
circumstances, and in contrast with Brown’s implied threshold view, the best we can 
hope for is the closest approximation to a state of affairs where all can participate 
fairly. This kind of judgement requires the weighting of reasons on both sides, and if 
we take the Legitimacy Argument seriously then the damage done to the democratic 
10 See also Tsesis (2009) for a discussion of how regimes with anti-hate speech laws can facilitate politi-
cal voice through other avenues.
11 Brown is not alone in this, and his interlocutors make similar claims. For example, Post argues 
that freedom of expression is about securing a ‘guarantee of political equality’ (Post 2017, p. 658, my 
emphasis).
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process by restricting hate speech will trump the Nuanced Principle in favour of 
restriction fairly frequently.
Given this indeterminacy, rather than trying to apply a general principle to the 
relationship between hate speech and democracy, like the Legitimacy Argument 
and the Nuanced Principle do on different sides of the debate, we should acknowl-
edge the conflicting reasons that arise in any given case and draw on the arguments 
underpinning these principles to better elucidate them.
Hate Speech Generates a Moral Blind Alley
I have argued that the most attractive version of the Legitimacy Argument, and the 
most pressing critiques of it, connect legitimacy to effective and not just formal 
political voice. For this to work, it requires others to comply with certain rules and 
norms, even where they are not enforceable through coercion or threat of punish-
ment. This places it within the realms of orthodox ideal theory.
This understanding of the application of theories of legitimacy in this context 
allows the following argument: that under ideal conditions, any restriction on hate 
speech would harm legitimacy, but under nonideal conditions they might enhance 
it; this is the position I adopt. This kind of argument has been deployed in favour of 
the restriction of hate speech in real-world conditions. Brown, for example, notes 
that the case for legislation against the incitement to hatred is more robust in socie-
ties where there are not strong social norms supporting equality amongst citizens 
(Brown 2008, p. 18), whilst Bonotti argues from a republican perspective that hate 
speech laws might be necessary to ensure non-domination in a public sphere which 
is already ‘ethnicised’ (Bonotti 2017, pp. 268–270).12 Both of these arguments 
resemble the case I have made against the Legitimacy Argument, in that they point 
to the attractiveness of unrestricted freedom of expression, but only under condi-
tions where certain norms are observed that do not currently persist. In this section, 
I develop this line of criticism using some of the literature around ideal and nonideal 
theory, specifically the account of moral blind alleys proposed by Schapiro and the 
use of the Theory of Second Best in economics as an analogy.
The core claim I make is that under ideal conditions restrictions on hate speech 
harm legitimacy, but hate speech does not. This is because restrictions on hate 
speech automatically harm legitimacy whilst hate speech alone does not. Limits on 
speech, by their nature, cut against an inclusive ideal of deliberation by temporarily 
excluding some perspectives or individuals from the political process. If you accept, 
as I do, that the hateful aspects of speech cannot be completely isolated from the 
context of this speech, and that therefore there is no way of effectively silencing 
just the hateful aspects of speech, there is no way that restrictions on hateful expres-
sion will not affect the political participation of the speaker, however minimally. My 
12 Bonotti here draws on Laborde’s distinction between the realisation of a republican ideal and an exist-
ing public sphere that is ‘ethnicised’ unfairly as a result of historic racial injustices (Laborde 2008, p. 
233).
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conjecture is that it is at least possible to imagine a context where hateful comments 
alone did not have these effects.
Unlike the effects of censorship, which are direct, the harmful effects of hate 
speech on democracy only occur in a given context where there are existing ine-
qualities and injustices. Hate speech does not undermine deliberative norms by its 
nature or as an intrinsic by-product of its content because such norms are independ-
ent of the content of the views expressed in discussion.13 Instead, hate speech can 
contribute to a moral environment where some citizens lose an effective political 
voice as a result of the way that democratic norms are reshaped. If the other condi-
tions assumed in the ideal theory of legitimacy persisted, the state would be able to 
mitigate or compensate for these effects. This is not the case under nonideal con-
ditions where social stigmatisation affects standing in politics in a more profound 
way. Brown is therefore correct that the targets of hate speech might reject a speech 
regime that protected speech that diminished their civic status through appeal to an 
interpersonal standard of justification—that is, that they might reasonably reject the 
authority of such a regime (Brown 2017, pp. 616–617)—though with the caveat that 
this argument only applies under nonideal conditions where background societal 
norms mean that the targets of hateful speech will see their civic status diminished.
Where I differ from Brown is in the weight I attach to ideal theory in provid-
ing action-guiding reasons. Brown, like me, criticises the Legitimacy Argument 
(albeit briefly) for assuming ideal conditions that do not pertain (Brown 2015, pp. 
188–189).14 However, in this passage, he appears to argue that the reason the Legiti-
macy Argument fails is because it offers an ideal of democracy but not a viable route 
to transitioning to this more favourable situation. With this in mind he worries that 
adhering to a free speech regime now, when these conditions do not pertain and 
will not come about, means ‘sacrificing’ the targets of hate speech at the moment in 
pursuit of an unattainable democratic ideal (Brown 2015, p. 189). I believe that ideal 
theory provides strong pro tanto moral reasons that retain normative force under 
nonideal conditions independent of the likely realisation of more just background 
conditions. In the rest of the paper I offer a more nuanced counter to the Legitimacy 
Argument that incorporates these strong pro tanto reasons, but still resists the idea 
that states should behave as if ideal conditions pertain when they do not.
Taking this approach to ideal theory means that in cases where an act of hate 
speech will shape background norms, and as a result adversely affect the way that 
some citizens are treated in deliberation there are not only competing pro tanto rea-
sons, but the state necessarily brings about an outcome that does not conform to a 
democratic ideal of co-authorship, whatever it does, or does not do. This is because 
two principles that are central to citizens having effective political voice conflict: 
13 See Bohman and Richardson (2009, p. 272) who make this point in defence of their account of the 
duties of civility in deliberation. The deliberative norms they invoke are similar to those I do, including 
a willingness to engage with others and revise views. In line with the framing of this paper, they also 
acknowledge that such views are highly idealised (Bohman and Richardson 2009, p. 273).
14 Although Brown emphasises existing inequalities of access to discursive resources as the relevant fea-
ture of nonideal conditions, rather than noncompliance with norms.
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non-interference by the state and maximal inclusion of perspectives on one hand, 
and equal standing amongst citizens on the other.15
Whatever course of action it chooses will incur some unjust cost, in this case by 
undermining the democratic process. The choice to be made is therefore the option 
that least undermines a democratic process, i.e. that undermines the political voice 
of citizens the least. These sort of choices—effectively of the least bad option—are 
not uncommon under nonideal conditions, and are characterised by Nagel as moral 
‘blind alleys’ (Nagel 1979, p. 74). For him, a blind alley is a situation where we 
must choose either to violate some non-consequentialist constraint, or to cause a 
worse outcome. Importantly, we have a valid reason to regret either course of action 
that is not offset by the all-things-considered benefit of taking the alternative option. 
Schapiro argues that there are blind alleys where either course of action open to a 
person will cause them to violate a non-consequentialist norm (Schapiro 2003, pp. 
332–334). This kind of blind alley can arise where non-conformity by other ethical 
actors causes a situation where the non-consequentialist duties we have come into 
conflict. In such cases, two non-consequentialist duties end up conflicting, and one 
does not take clear priority over another. A subset of these cases is those where there 
is a single overarching demand of people, say to treat others with equal respect, 
which produces correlative duties.
This can occur when states seek to enforce a democratic system based on legiti-
mate policy-making that is founded on an underlying value of respect, but requires 
a range of rights and institutions to work effectively. For state actors blind alleys can 
and do arise where any possible option entails undermining the political voice of 
some citizens. Any course of action available to them will incur significant cost, as 
it will involve violating core political rights, or fundamental democratic principles.
This is the kind of choice faced by states when they consider whether to sanction 
those who perform acts of hate speech. They must violate the norms associated with 
preserving deliberation whatever path they choose, because any course of action will 
undermine the political voice of some. If they restrict a speaker of hate speech they 
undermine deliberation by preventing that individual from participating in the politi-
cal process, and being able to scrutinise policies or advance their interests. However, 
if they do not restrict acts of hate speech some other citizens will be denied their 
political voice, either through intimidation or marginalisation, or as a by-product of 
damage to deliberative institutions. Kirshner offers a good general summary of the 
limitations we need to consider when approaching the question of how to respond to 
unreasonable and anti-democratic citizens, which is appropriate when we consider 
whether to regulate ‘hate speech’:
… I contend that the dilemma raised but those who oppose democracy will be 
more tractable if we treat defensive policies as efforts to augment the demo-
15 Joshua Cohen argues that deliberative democrats face a similar dilemma, in that the dual virtue of 
inclusion and effective participation may clash in practice (Cohen 1997b, p. 424). Given that the authors 
that I am dealing with emphasise co-authorship of laws, I suggest there is a minimally deliberative com-
ponent to their conceptions of democracy, so this analysis holds.
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cratic character of flawed regimes, instead of as attempts to preserve a moral 
community or any other idealized status quo (Kirshner 2014, p. 17).
 Confronted by this blind alley, it is therefore impossible to posit a sufficient rea-
son for a partially legitimate state to impinge upon speech acts that are not direct 
invocations of physical harm. There is no way of presenting a principle of the form: 
‘speech ought never to be restricted, unless it includes content X in circumstances 
Y’. Instead, we can posit necessary conditions and pro tanto reasons for interference. 
In the case of hate speech, where a speech act impinges upon how other citizens par-
ticipate politically, there is a pro tanto reason to restrict the freedom of expression 
of the speaker. However, it is not an all-things-considered reason because there is 
also a cost to silencing citizens in the process of deliberation. Hate speech having 
the effect of reducing effective political voice is a necessary condition for justified 
restriction on democratic grounds. However, it is only a necessary condition—each 
case must be considered individually, to establish the extent to which both restric-
tion and non-restriction cause deviation from the democratic ideal. What is more, 
there may be cases where this is hard to discern. Effective political voice depends 
on a range of factors, so assessing the way that restriction and non-restriction of hate 
speech impacts this is difficult to establish. Different ways that political voice may 
be undermined are not necessarily commensurable. In this way, the role of an ideal 
democratic theory is to help characterise the nature of the harms of both courses of 
(in-)action.16
This framing of the argument has two advantages. First, it renders explicit aspects 
of the democratic case for hate speech regulation in the existing literature. For exam-
ple, after surveying the effects of hate speech laws, Tsesis concludes that whilst free-
dom of expression is ‘essential to collective decision making’ (my emphasis), hate 
speech might cause individuals to justifiably feel threatened, or inculcate discrim-
inatory behaviour that also undermines political autonomy (Tsesis 2009, p. 532). 
Reconciling these dual claims is central to a democratic argument for hate speech 
regulation and my framing offers a way of doing this. Second, it diffuses some of 
the potency of the Legitimacy Argument without denying the central premise that 
a right to freedom of expression is essential to democratic legitimacy. In respond-
ing to Waldron’s critique of the Legitimacy Argument, Dworkin makes the point 
that we should not defend the censorship of hate speech on the grounds that ‘[w]e 
can hardly justify a defect in political legitimacy by arguing that it might have been 
worse’ (Dworkin 2012, p. 341); if you accept my framing of the choice as a moral 
blind alley, this kind of argument actually becomes quite attractive.
16 This is in line with the view of ideal theory defended by Swift (2008) amongst others.
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Why Non‑interference is Not Always the Best Option
Using the framework of ideal and nonideal theory in this case allows for the argu-
ment that there are strong reasons against non-interference, but that these are not all-
things-considered reasons for the state not to act. One of the reasons for this is that 
when confronted with nonideal circumstances, behaving as we would under ideal 
conditions may actually exacerbate some of the harms that occur. When confronted 
with a blind alley, the wrong thing to do would be to imagine a world in which the 
ideal option would be open to us, and to then act, as far as is possible, as if this were 
the case.
In the case of hate speech, we might have reason to restrict freedom of expression 
because permitting it causes greater harms to others, or damages the process of the 
justification of laws more, than restricting them would. This is because, as noted 
above, the question is how best to achieve the closest approximation to a democratic 
ideal, rather than the ideal itself, which is unattainable due to structural constraints 
and widespread noncompliance. When some actors are using acts of expression to 
undermine the political rights of others, leaving them be just because this best con-
forms to the ideal will not necessarily bring about the best achievable realisation of 
political rights.
This line of argument echoes the Theory of Second Best (ToSB) in economics.17 
ToSB posits that if one is presented with an optimal situation, then introduces some 
constraint, the second best outcome is not necessarily achieved by leaving all other 
things the same. In economic terms, the optimal outcome here is pareto optimal, and 
the types of constraints are those that disrupt this economic equilibrium (Lipsey and 
Lancaster 1956). When a constraint is introduced that prevents this optimum being 
met, there is no reason to assume that there will be a favourable outcome achieved by 
maintaining the other constraints that led to that equilibrium being reached (Lipsey 
and Lancaster 1956, p. 11). Furthermore, there is no a priori way of judging between 
possible second best outcomes with reference to the initial, stipulated optimum con-
ditions (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956, p. 12). Indeed, the breaking of paretian rules in 
some cases might increase overall welfare or utility (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956, p. 
31). There is also unlikely to be a ‘simple sufficient condition’ to increase welfare 
where the optimum outcome cannot be achieved (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956, p. 31).
If this analogy is relevant when thinking of the relationship between freedom of 
expression and legitimacy, it would therefore support my positions that there is no 
simple solution to determining how best to configure a right to freedom of expres-
sion to secure political voice; and that we ought not automatically assume that it is 
a maximally expansive right, which protects hate speech, as it would be under ideal 
conditions. There are two claims that need to hold if the analogy of ToSB is going to 
be useful to discuss restrictions on hate speech on democratic grounds. First, there 
needs to be a desirable, best outcome. Here, it is a legitimate democratic system. 
17 The Theory of Second Best has been applied to ideal theory by various authors. For a thorough dis-
cussion see Wiens (2016).
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Second, this must rely on various things being true simultaneously; again, I believe 
that this is the case.
The first of these is easier to demonstrate. Although there is not a measurable 
optimum goal, like maximum welfare or resources, as there would be in examples 
that apply ToSB in economics, we can assume that the desired outcome is one 
where all people have sufficient opportunity to participate in politics such that laws 
are justified, as outlined in the previous sections. The main difference is that this is 
a situation where various non-consequentialist rights are effectively secured, rather 
than one where a consequentialist metric is maximised, but for the purposes of the 
analogy it is fair to treat this as an optimum.
The most convincing versions of the Legitimacy Argument also pre-supposes a 
variety of factors that contribute to political voice. To illustrate this, we can split 
the way that the legitimacy argument is presented into two versions, that I will call 
‘Single Law’ legitimacy and ‘Systemic’ legitimacy. By Systemic legitimacy, I take 
it to mean that legitimate laws depend on the authority of institutions, which in turn 
depends on a proper process being followed. According to this version of the Legiti-
macy Argument, hate speech restrictions harm the legitimacy of laws in general, 
because they distort the overall process of co-authoring laws.
If we accept this view of legitimacy, the ToSB offers a useful and fairly direct 
parallel. It is fair to treat the democratic process as a process with many ‘moving 
parts’. There are various political rights, and institutional arrangements, that need to 
function for citizens to be able to possess the political voice required such that they 
can participate in a process of deliberation that can produce legitimate policies by 
liberal standards. ToSB is relevant because it holds for economic arguments where 
multiple different kinds of policy instruments are used to achieve a particular goal. 
This mirrors an ideal situation where the fair level of political voice is simultane-
ously realised by all citizens. The ideal of deliberation requires not just favourable 
background conditions, but that citizens conform to certain behavioural norms con-
cerning respectful deliberation. When citizens start to disregard these systematically 
it unbalances the rest of the deliberative process (Wiens 2016, p. 140).18
The Single Law version of the legitimacy argument is a little harder to cast in 
these terms, but it is still possible. According to this perspective, the legitimacy of a 
given law depends on people being able to effectively influence the passage of that 
law. So, for example, Weinstein offers a stylised version of a real-world case where 
an evangelical wedding photographer is deterred from protesting against the legali-
sation of same-sex marriage as a result of hate speech laws. She is then subject to 
laws—which she disagrees with and had planned to protest—that prevent her from 
denying her services to same-sex couples celebrating weddings (Weinstein 2017a, 
18 Wiens’s point here is that the Theory of Second Best, when applied to political theory, ought to con-
sider not just background conditions, but also the behaviour of actors, as amongst the ‘inputs’ that pro-
duce the desired equilibrium. He offers a more detailed defence of this point at (Wiens 2016, pp. 139–
141). I merely note that, however convincing one does or does not find this, in the case of political voice 
deliberation requires that we treat each other as equals, and that this norm is sufficiently important that 
the equilibrium is unbalanced when it is violated routinely.
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pp. 567–568).19 The point of the legitimacy argument made like this is that the legit-
imacy of specific laws depends on the process by which they were produced. This 
version of the Legitimacy Argument might seem to be insulated from my concerns. 
After all, if we can point to specific instances where a hate speaker has been pre-
vented from participating fully in the formation of a particular law, then other con-
cerns might be put to one side.
This argument falls flat for two reasons. First, the main thrust of the criticisms of 
the Legitimacy Argument I have outlined is that allowing the hate speaker to speak 
hatefully in some contexts might prevent others from participating in an analogous 
way (Stone 2017, p. 691). Second, the example still relies on acts of expression 
translating into political influence. If, for example, hate speakers were allowed to 
speak, but were defamed such that others disregarded their opinion in political delib-
eration, then their right to freedom of expression would have been insufficient for 
their having a sufficiently effective political voice. Even if we approach the process 
of legitimising laws on an individual level, and do not consider the idea of system-
atic or institutional legitimacy, the procedure is still complex, and involves multiple 
sets of behaviours working in tandem to be effective.
To summarise, the optimum outcome is one where all laws produced are legit-
imate according to the broadly liberal standards described in this article. This 
requires a particular process of deliberation and justification; a set of political insti-
tutions; and the effective realisation of political rights including a wide-ranging right 
to freedom of expression are constitutive of this. In practice, not all of these rights 
can be realised simultaneously, so the process necessary for legitimate law-making 
cannot be realised as a result of widespread non-compliance. The analogy with the 
Theory of Second Best shows that when we structure the case like this, the best pos-
sible approximation to the ideal of deliberation might be achieved by changing some 
of the variables away from what they would be in the ideal case. In this way, restric-
tions on hate speech might be the best way to realise the closest possible approxima-
tion to legitimate policy-making, even if, by their nature, they are incompatible with 
the full realisation of this ideal.
Conclusion
This paper has broadly sided with those who have argued that the restriction of hate 
speech might actually enhance democratic legitimacy. However, it has done so from 
a perspective that is in many ways sympathetic to the opposing view: the Legiti-
macy Argument. I have argued that proponents of this argument are correct about 
the harms that censorship, even of hateful speech, inflict on the democratic process. 
Their main error is in underestimating the implications of the fact that the account 
of legitimacy pre-supposed in their arguments depends on citizens having an effec-
tive political voice, which is the effective capacity to shape policies. In particular, 
19 Weinstein’s article focuses mostly on developing the ‘single law’ version of the legitimacy argument, 
as he acknowledges (Weinstein 2017a, p. 535).
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they understate the ways that that this capacity is relational; and that the kinds of 
social relations required for this do not fully pertain in the real world. Protecting 
hate speech under nonideal conditions like this might restrict the political voice of 
its targets in a way that it would not if there were more favourable conditions and 
greater compliance with democratic norms. Where this is the case there are strong 
pro tanto reasons in favour of both restricting hate speech, and permitting it as part 
of a wide-ranging right to freedom of expression. These must be weighted against 
each other on a case-by-case basis to determine the effect of restrictions on legiti-
macy in the specific context.
This is in some ways a non-conclusion. It suggests that neither the Legitimacy 
Argument nor its critics have landed a ‘knockout blow’, because neither sides’ argu-
ments eliminate the pro tanto moral force of the reasons on the other side. It is also a 
frustrating conclusion, because it implies that in certain instances hate speech regu-
lation might enhance legitimacy, but at the same time, it rules out a general princi-
ple for determining when this is in terms of the content and context of said speech. 
I have argued that some restrictions on hate speech are justified with reference to 
legitimacy, without making the case for particular laws that restrict hateful speech; 
indeed, according to my framework there are inherent difficulties in trying to estab-
lish laws around hate speech at the abstract level. In defence of the project, I would 
note that the article has only discussed legitimacy as a normative standard. Its goal 
is to offer a framework to determine whether hate speech restrictions harmed the 
legitimacy of laws. In line with this, whilst the article does not propose a specific 
formulation for when to restrict hateful speech, it suggests a framework for under-
standing the relationship between hate speech and legitimacy in different cases.
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